Last Revised on August 13, 2025: See CAE Academician Liu Yunjie commentary on Cyber Great Power

The Cyber Great Power strategy is China’s national development strategy for transforming itself from a cyber major power to a cyber great power. In February 2014, General Secretary Xi Jinping set the strategic goal of making China a Cyber Great Power and laid out clear requirements for achieving it, including mastering core Internet technologies, fostering a healthy online culture, improving information infrastructure, strengthening the ranks of Internet talent, and promoting international cooperation on the Internet. 网络强国战略是中国为实现由网络大国到网络强国而拟定的国家发展战略。2014年2月，习近平总书记提出了努力把中国建设成为网络强国的战略目标，并从掌握互联网核心科技、建设健康网络文化、完善信息基础设施、加强互联网人才队伍建设、开展互联网国际合作等方面，对如何建设网络强国提出了明确的要求。

“The ‘Cyber Great Power’ Strategy,” State Council Information Office, March 16, 2018

Note: The State Council Information Office incorrectly translates “网络强国战略” as “Internet Power Strategy” in its official English language translation

China has a national cyber strategy. It is called Cyber Great Power.

Cyber Great Power (网络强国) is China’s national cyber strategy, designed to secure and control the cyber domain by asserting sovereignty over networks, data, and platforms while strengthening the state’s ability to defend and project power in cyberspace.

Unlike the original transformative focus of Digital China at the national level, Cyber Great Power is a purely competitive approach to the cyber domain focused on building Chinese strength in cyberspace against the perception of growing U.S. containment. It is important for us to remember that when it comes to the Party’s national cyber strategy, cooperation is a tool, not the goal. The ultimate aim is the attainment of Cyber Great Power status.

Cyber Great Power transition, missed

The father of China’s national cyber strategy, Zheng Bijian, set a target of 2023 to match the United States in the cyber domain, and Beijing missed it. I say this because PRC theorists at the time were still describing China’s “great power transition” from a cyber “major power” (大国) to a cyber “great power” (强国). We should understand why (and if) the target date was missed, how success (or failure) is measured, and what’s next.

We should also understand the original zero-sum logic behind Cyber Great Power and its impact on the Party’s strategic end state for its “digital triad” of national strategies. This guide begins that process by laying out a brief history of the emergence of the Cyber Great Power concept in April 2013 through its publication as a national strategy in December 2017.

Origin and intent of China’s Cyber Great Power strategy

Two classified Party-state documents published in 2013 provide a rare opportunity to understand the origin and intent of China’s Cyber Great Power strategy authoritatively. These two documents, translated, archived, and described below, lay out the concept of Cyber Great Power for China’s senior leaders (civilian and military) for the first time. These documents were likely part of the package that hit Xi Jinping’s desk for decision in 2014.

April 3, 2013: Zheng Bijian proposes Cyber Great Power to the State Council Secretariat

On June 4, 2013, the State Council Secretariat published a classified summary of an April 3, 2013 proposal on Cyber Great Power made by the brilliant Marxist theorist Zheng Bijian. Zheng and I sat in a graduate seminar together in the 1980s so I can say brilliant with some authority. Zheng argued to central authorities that China must build itself into a world class Cyber Great Power within 10 years.

Zheng’s timeline and recommendation were based on his assessment that U.S. policy to contain China had expanded from physical space to cyberspace, and China needed a strategy to respond. For Zheng, “cyber warfare is no longer a matter of whether China wants to fight, but instead how long before it will be forced to act.”

July 28, 2013: The Central Committee accepts Zheng Bijian’s Cyber Great Power proposal

Zheng Bijian’s April 2013 proposal for China to become a world-class Cyber Great Power within ten years was considered, accepted, and then forwarded in July 2013 for “further review” by four members of Politburo (one of them a Standing Committee member and two of them Central Military Commission vice chairs). The notice specified that China must catch up (with the U.S.) and build itself into a Cyber Great Power with a clear strategy, advanced technology, industrial leadership, and a well-equipped government.

The Central Committee Notice was signed by senior Party leaders, both military and civilian. In China, cyberspace was a “fused” military-civil domain from the start. A lot more to come on that, and what it means for Digital China.

February 27, 2014: Xi Jinping proposes Cyber Great Power at the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization

Zheng’s proposal was publicly accepted by Xi Jinping when he called for China to achieve Cyber Great Power status during the first meeting of the newly formed Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization on February 27, 2014.

Interestingly, there is some evidence that Zheng Bijian’s 10-year timeline still stands. Party discourse on the status of China’s transition from a cyber (major) power to a cyber (great) power has appeared more regularly in Party discourse, just as Zheng’s 2023 deadline has past.

December 27, 2016: The Cyberspace Administration of China releases the National Cyberspace Security Strategy

On December 27, 2016, with the approval of the the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) released the National Cyberspace Security Strategy (国家网络空间安全战略). You can read full translations of the strategy at China Copyright and Media and digwatch. Rogier Creemers provides an excellent analysis of the Chinese concept of cybersecurity, and includes the strategy in his historical review, in the Journal of Contemporary China. State-run English-language outlets have also published both brief and detailed summaries. In short, the document has been well covered.

But what is overlooked in English is its deeper purpose: the strategy’s direct line to Zheng Bijian’s 2013 call for China to become a Cyber Great Power. The public-facing text in the strategy is important as it explains the “how.” But what truly matters is its strategic goal, the “why,” and it is difficult to find in English.

Yet the strategy’s strategic objective is stated plainly in the final clause of the opening paragraph of Section Two (Objectives): “…achieve the strategic objective of building a Cyber Great Power (…实现建设网络强国的战略目标).”

Cooperation is a means, not the end. The ultimate aim is the attainment of Cyber Great Power status.

You’ve got the history. Now take a master class on Cyber Great Power by CAE Academician Liu Yunjie

A word on the translation of Cyber Great Power

“Cyber Great Power,” not “cyber powerhouse”

Translating Cyber Great Power (网络强国) into English presents a special challenge, as both elements of the term, “cyber” and “great power,” raise distinct translation issues that need to be addressed individually.