Last Updated on June 10, 2025 to link the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology “Reference Guide on the Fused Application of the Industrial Internet in the Shipbuilding Industry.”
China’s leaders have long pursued better integration across the country’s military and civilian science and technology systems. A fused Industrial Internet would represent a major step toward achieving that goal.
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology recently published the 2022 Work Plan for the Industrial Internet Special Working Group. The plan is extensive. It covers “5G + Industrial Internet,” enterprise network transformation, identifier resolution, platform systems, industrial data, industrial safety, standards, technology, security, finance, talent, and organization.
A detailed analysis of the full work plan will be a future project on this site. For now, three points stand out.
First, the Industrial Internet is a high-priority national program for Beijing. It is one of the core mechanisms through which Digital China enters the real economy and digitally transforms China’s industrial base.
Second, shipbuilding appears directly in the 2022 Work Plan. The plan calls for applying 5G in ship final assembly and construction, completing 5G fused network deployment, and demonstrating typical application scenarios. Shipbuilding also appears in the identifier-resolution section, where the plan calls for active identifier carriers to be deployed at scale in industries including instruments, automobiles, and ships.
Third, the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) is an original member of the Industrial Internet Special Working Group,1 joining when the group was first formed in 2018. The 2018 Work Plan for the Special Working Group assigned a specific Industrial Internet task to SASTIND’s System Engineering Third Department, a department linked through predecessor structures to shipbuilding. The 2022 Work Plan continues the broader pattern. SASTIND remains visible in the Working Group structure, and shipbuilding appears as one of the named application fields. Unlike in 2018, however, SASTIND is not named in the individual shipbuilding task assignments.
SASTIND involvement does not mean that the Industrial Internet is a Military-Civil Fusion program. It does mean that China’s defense industrial authority was present inside the Industrial Internet coordination structure from the beginning. That pattern deserves attention.
The Industrial Internet Is a High Priority for Beijing
The Industrial Internet is not a minor technical program. It emerged from the State Council’s November 2017 Guiding Opinion on Deepening “Internet Plus Advanced Manufacturing” and Developing the Industrial Internet (关于深化“互联网+先进制造业”发展工业互联网的指导意见), which became the programmatic document for China’s Industrial Internet development.
In May 2018, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) followed with the Industrial Internet Development Action Plan (2018–2020) (工业互联网发展行动计划 2018-2020年). The plan described 2018–2020 as the startup phase of China’s Industrial Internet construction and stated that this period would have a profound impact on future development. Its objective was to build the initial Industrial Internet infrastructure and industrial system by 2020, including advanced networks, identifier resolution, platform systems, security capabilities, core technologies, and industry applications.
That same plan framed the Industrial Internet as a tool for supporting both a Manufacturing Great Power and a Cyber Great Power. This is important. From the beginning, the Industrial Internet was not treated as ordinary factory IT modernization. It was presented as a national infrastructure and industrial transformation project.
The Industrial Internet became an even more explicit national priority in 2020. In March, MIIT issued the Notice on Advancing the Accelerated Development of the Industrial Internet (《关于推动工业互联网加快发展的通知》), often summarized as the Industrial Internet “Twenty Measures.” The document called for accelerating Industrial Internet development across six areas: New Type Infrastructure construction (新型基础设施建设), expanding fused and innovative applications (拓展融合创新应用), strengthening the security assurance system (健全安全保障体系), expanding drivers for innovative development (壮大创新发展动能), optimizing the industrial ecosystem layout (完善产业生态布局), and increasing the level of policy support (加大政策支持力度).
The content of the notice shows why this is important. It specifically called for upgrading Industrial Internet internal and external networks, strengthening the identifier resolution system, improving platform capabilities, building the National Industrial Internet Big Data Center, expanding industry applications, deepening “5G + Industrial Internet,” and establishing monitoring and evaluation systems. It also emphasized the Industrial Internet’s role in connecting all factors, the entire industrial chain, and the entire value chain.
The timing is significant. In October 2020, the Fifth Plenum of the 19th Party Congress further elevated the Industrial Internet within the emerging 14th Five-Year Plan framework. The Industrial Internet was no longer only an MIIT implementation program following the 2017 State Council guidance. It had become part of Beijing’s broader agenda for New Type Infrastructure, Digital China, advanced manufacturing, and the digital economy.
MIIT then issued the Industrial Internet Innovative Development Action Plan 2021–2023 (工业互联网创新发展行动计划 2021-2023年) in December 2020. This plan marked the transition from startup to rapid growth. It stated that the 2018–2020 startup-phase action plan had been completed, and that 2021–2023 would be the rapid-growth phase for China’s Industrial Internet. The plan’s five developmental priorities were New Type Infrastructure (新型基础设施), fused application effectiveness (融合应用成效), technology innovation capacity (技术创新能力), industrial development ecosystem (产业发展生态), and security assurance capability (安全保障能力).
In March 2022, the Industrial Internet also appeared in Premier Li Keqiang’s 2022 Government Work Report. In the section on “Advancing the Development of the Digital Economy,” the report called for strengthening the “holistic” layout of Digital China construction (加强数字中国建设整体布局) in a wide range of areas including “accelerating the development of the Industrial Internet.”
In short, by 2022 the Industrial Internet was not only an MIIT program. It was part of the Central Committee and State Council’s broader agenda to strengthen Digital China, advanced manufacturing, the digital economy, and the transformation of the real economy.
Industrial Internet Work Plans Show SASTIND Inside the Structure
The 2022 Work Plan is the entry point for this blog, but the institutional trail begins earlier. In May 2018, MIIT issued both the Industrial Internet Development Action Plan (2018–2020) (工业互联网发展行动计划 2018-2020年) and the Industrial Internet Special Working Group 2018 Work Plan (工业互联网专项工作组 2018 年工作计划). The 2018 Work Plan established the Industrial Internet Special Working Group under the National Manufacturing Great Power Construction Leading Small Group (国家制造强国建设领导小组) and convened its founding meeting that same month.
SASTIND was part of that structure from the start. In the Industrial Internet Development Action Plan for 2018–2020, SASTIND appeared in the responsibility structure for Industrial Internet development in two specific areas.
The first sub-group, composed of six ministerial and vice-ministerial agencies,2 was directed to develop approximately 150 pilot projects by 2020 that would advance the level of Industrial Internet innovation and application within large-scale enterprises and accelerate the widespread adoption of the Industrial Internet among small and medium-sized enterprises.
The second sub-group, composed of nine ministerial and vice-ministerial level agencies,3 was directed to establish a “basically complete” institutional framework for fused development (融合发展制度) of the Industrial Internet by 2020. This included establishing efficient inter-departmental and central-local coordination mechanisms; facilitating system integration (系统对接) across different departments and regions; improving mechanisms for collaborative development; strengthening industry organizations like the Industrial Internet Industry Alliance; and coordinating with industry stakeholders to conduct R&D in technology, standards, and applications, as well as to facilitate investment and financing matchmaking, and to conduct international exchanges.
The 2018 Work Plan then assigned SASTIND’s System Engineering Third Department to conduct trials by December 2018 interconnecting relevant systems with industrial control systems (开展相关系统与工业控制系统互联试点). This task supported innovative applications in areas such as intelligentized manufacturing, remote services, networked collaborative manufacturing, smart interconnected products, and integrated identifier resolution (智能化生产, 远程服务, 网络协同制造, 智能联网产品, 标识解析集成).
Notably, the predecessor organization to SASTIND, the former Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), identified its System Engineering Third Department as the Shipbuilding Industry Management Office (船舶行业管理办公室). Public information on current SASTIND department responsibilities is limited, but the retained bureaucratic structure from COSTIND makes the continued association between the System Engineering Third Department and shipbuilding very likely.
By 2022, the Industrial Internet had moved from startup into rapid growth. The Industrial Internet Special Working Group 2022 Work Plan shows that acceleration. It coordinates work across the “5G + Industrial Internet” initiative, enterprise network transformation, identifier resolution, platform systems, industrial data, industrial safety, standards, technology, security, finance, talent, and organization.
Shipbuilding appears directly in the 2022 Work Plan. The plan calls for applying 5G in ship final assembly and construction, completing 5G fused network deployment (5G 融合网络部署), and demonstrating typical application scenarios. Shipbuilding also appears in the identifier resolution section, where the plan calls for active identifier carriers to be deployed at scale in industries including instruments, automobiles, and ships.
Unlike in 2018, SASTIND is not named in the individual 2022 shipbuilding task assignments. But MIIT’s accompanying graphic identifies SASTIND as a member of the Industrial Internet Special Working Group. The point is not that SASTIND directed the 2022 shipbuilding tasks. The point is that SASTIND was present in the Industrial Internet coordination structure from the beginning, and by 2022 shipbuilding was explicitly visible in the Work Plan.
It is a pattern worth our increased attention. It shows that the Industrial Internet’s institutional development, SASTIND’s defense-industrial role, and shipbuilding’s appearance as an application field were not separate facts. They formed an emerging policy trail: from Working Group formation in 2018 with SASTIND participation, to shipbuilding’s explicit inclusion in the 2022 Industrial Internet agenda.
What the Work Plans Suggest About Military-Civil Fusion
The 2018 and 2022 Work Plans do not openly define the Industrial Internet as a Military-Civil Fusion program. They should not be read that way. The evidence in this post is narrower, but still important.
The Industrial Internet was designed as a national system for connecting industrial equipment, platforms, data, identifiers, networks, production processes, supply chains, and industrial applications. SASTIND, the agency responsible for China’s defense science, technology, and industry system, was present in that structure from the beginning. Shipbuilding, a dual-use industry with deep defense-industrial significance, was explicitly named in the 2022 Work Plan.
That combination is important because it shows where the Industrial Internet and Military-Civil Fusion begin to overlap inside Digital China. The overlap is not expressed through an obvious slogan. It appears through institutional participation, industrial-chain application, and the digital infrastructure used to connect production systems.
This is why the 2022 Work Plan deserves renewed attention. It does not complete the Military-Civil Fusion argument. But it helps establish the institutional trail: Industrial Internet coordination, SASTIND participation, and shipbuilding application were all visible before MIIT published the Reference Guide on the Fused Application of the Industrial Internet in the Shipbuilding Industry in 2025.
In that sense, the Work Plans point toward a larger question. Is Military-Civil Fusion still best understood mainly through firms, factories, universities, technologies, and procurement channels? Or is it increasingly being organized through digital systems that connect entire strategic industrial chains?
That larger question will be addressed in later analysis. For now, the 2018–2022 record shows that the question is worth asking.
Conclusion: A Clue to a Larger Pattern
The 2022 Industrial Internet Special Working Group Work Plan does not prove the full relationship between the Industrial Internet and Military-Civil Fusion. But it does provide an important institutional clue.
This essay looked backward from the 2022 Work Plan and shows that the institutional trail began years earlier. SASTIND was present in the Industrial Internet coordination structure from the beginning, and shipbuilding appeared explicitly in the 2022 Industrial Internet agenda.
For now, the key point is simple: the Industrial Internet is not only a manufacturing upgrade. It is part of Digital China’s operating architecture for strategic industrial transformation. SASTIND’s presence inside that architecture points to a defense-industrial dimension that deserves closer attention.
Foonotes
- SASTIND is a State Council bureau administered by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology at the deputy ministerial level. Its public mandate places it at the center of China’s defense science, technology, and industry system, making its presence in the Industrial Internet Special Working Group significant for understanding the program’s military-civil implications. According to the SASTIND website, “the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense is the administrative agency of the Chinese government responsible for managing the national defense science, technology, and industry sector. It is charged with organizing and coordinating major matters concerning the research, development, and production of weapons and equipment across fields such as nuclear energy, aerospace, aviation, shipbuilding, ordnance, and electronics, as well as with building core capabilities within the defense industries.” (国家国防科技工业局是中国政府负责管理国防科技工业的行政管理机关，负责核、航天、航空、船舶、兵器、电子等领域武器装备科研生产重大事项的组织协调和军工核心能力建设。) ↩︎
- Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; National Development and Reform Commission; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Commerce; State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense; and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. ↩︎
- Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; National Development and Reform Commission; Ministry of Science and Technology; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Commerce; Ministry of Emergency Management; State Administration for Market Regulation; National Intellectual Property Administration; and State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. ↩︎