China’s Military-Civil Fusion Is Changing Form, Part 1/5: The Industrial Internet as Operating Architecture

Accelerate the development of advanced industrial technologies, bolster R&D in areas such as additive manufacturing, intelligent robots, and the industrial internet, and enhance the digitalization, networkization, and intelligentization of defense industry manufacturing.

Director Zhang Kejian, “Strive to Write a New Chapter in the Innovative Development of the National Defense, Science, and Technology Industry in the New Era,” State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, May 18, 2018.¹

Military-Civil Fusion defines the strategic goal. The Industrial Internet offers the operating system to achieve it.

Military-Civil Fusion is often misunderstood because the English phrase sounds familiar. It can sound like “civil-military integration,” defense innovation, dual-use technology, or closer cooperation between commercial industry and the military. But China’s Military-Civil Fusion is not the same thing. It is a Party-state strategy for integrating economic development, defense construction, science and technology, industrial capacity, and national strategic capability. Treating it as a familiar Western concept makes it easier to miss what is distinctive about the Chinese system.

This essay argues that Military-Civil Fusion did not simply become less visible after the term grew politically costly abroad. In important areas, it changed form. The clearest example is China’s Industrial Internet. What appears on the surface as manufacturing modernization, enterprise digitalization, or industrial cloud construction also creates a platform architecture for discovering, connecting, securing, coordinating, and mobilizing industrial resources across supply chains.

That does not mean every Industrial Internet project is military. It means the Industrial Internet deserves attention as operating architecture: a system of platforms, data, networks, security mechanisms, and industrial coordination tools through which Military-Civil Fusion functions can be organized at scale. To understand where Military-Civil Fusion is going, we should not only look for the label. We should look for the operating system.

Beijing has criticized Washington for “overstretching the concept of national security” in export controls and company-specific restrictions.² Washington argues that national-security controls are necessary to prevent sensitive technologies from supporting China’s military modernization. That debate is already difficult. The Industrial Internet will make it harder.

What the public debate does not yet account for is the growing relationship between Military-Civil Fusion and China’s Industrial Internet. By Party definition, Military-Civil Fusion stretches across China’s entire industrial system, both military and civilian. By Party design, the Industrial Internet offers a platform for bringing military and civilian industrial supply chains into closer convergence. The process is not complete, but it has been underway for more than a decade. We will track it here.

The debate over which side is “overstretching” national security is about to become more difficult — and the answers harder to find.

China’s Military-Civil Fusion is not Western-style civil-military integration, and it is changing form inside the Industrial Internet, where strategy becomes infrastructure.

---

Article Roadmap

This essay is the first part in a five-part series that examines the historical linkages between the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy and the buildout of the Industrial Internet in the period from 2015 to 2020.

This roadmap covers Part One only. Part One establishes the strategic and conceptual foundation for the series in five sections:

Part Two of this series will begin to examine the documentary record. The complete five-part series will establish a historical baseline. Once that baseline is in place, future essays will dive deeper into the 2015–2020 period and separately examine accelerating developments in technology and policy from 2021 to the present.

---

1. Military-Civil Fusion inside the National Strategic System

In our country, Military-Civil Fusion has become an expression of the Party’s will and a national undertaking…

Ji Wenbo, “The Deepening and Expansion of the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy Since the 18th Party Congress,” National Defense, December 8, 2017.³ (National Defense is a monthly journal published by the PLA Academy of Military Sciences.)

Military-Civil Fusion operates inside China’s National Strategic System, not just inside firms, labs, procurement channels, or dual-use technologies.

China’s Military-Civil Fusion is often understood through firms, factories, universities, procurement relationships, research labs, and dual-use technologies. That understanding remains useful, but it is no longer sufficient. The rise of the Industrial Internet is moving Military-Civil Fusion from individual entities and technologies into the operating architecture of China’s industrial system.⁴ Military-Civil Fusion is changing form because the Industrial Internet is creating the conditions for fusion to become more systemic.

Military-Civil Fusion in China encompasses theoretical concepts, political ambitions, and strategic goals well beyond conventional thinking outside China about dual-use technology or civil-military integration. During the period from 2015 to 2017, China elevated Military-Civil Fusion from central guidance on coordinating economic construction and national defense construction into a named “national development strategy.”⁵

As the “Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy,” it now operated within China’s “National Strategic System”⁶ and carried a significantly expanded role. Military-Civil Fusion was no longer simply a policy for coordinating people, programs, and technologies. It was now an elite national strategy to closely integrate military-civil fusion across the Party’s larger system of national strategies — overall, development, and security — in support of the Party’s mid-century ambition to build a Modernized Socialist Great Power.⁷

That distinction is important because national development strategy is not casual wording. In Chinese strategic writing, it sits inside a hierarchy of national strategy. Following the 19th Party Congress, two National Defense University scholars affiliated with the Military-Civil Fusion Development Research Center explained the structure this way in Guangming Daily, a major “cultural and ideological”⁸ newspaper published by the Central Committee:

A National Strategic System is an organic strategic system formed to realize national interests. The Overall (Grand) National Strategy occupies the highest position, followed by National Development Strategies and National Security Strategies. National Development Strategies are divided into strategies across various domains such as politics, economy, culture, society, and the environment, while National Security Strategies are divided into strategies for various security domains, as well as military strategy, among others.

Jiang Luming, Wang Weihai, “Building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability,” Guangming Daily, November 10, 2017.⁹ (The authors are both affiliated with the Military-Civil Fusion Development Research Center at National Defense University.)

This framework explains why Military-Civil Fusion should not be treated merely as China’s version of dual-use policy or civil-military integration. Once placed inside the National Strategic System, Military-Civil Fusion becomes part of a larger strategic effort to coordinate development, security, economy, science and technology, industry, and national defense. After the 19th Party Congress, the goal was no longer only to improve dual-use coordination between economic construction and national defense construction. It was to support a new “Unified National Strategic System and Capability”¹⁰ driven by the “close integration”¹¹ of all national development strategies and national security strategies.

The same Guangming Daily article also helps clarify the relationship between National Strategic Capability and the National Strategic System:

A National Strategic Capability is the capability to mobilize and deploy national strategic resources to achieve national strategic objectives. It is specifically embodied in a country’s economic capability, military capability, S&T capability, organizational and mobilization capability, institutional reform capability, strategic planning capability, national cohesion, and other such capabilities. The National Strategic System and Capability form an organic whole, uniting national strategic will and strategic capability. The purpose of building a complete and effective National Strategic System is to form strong National Strategic Capability, and ultimately to realize national strategic will.

Jiang Luming, Wang Weihai, “Building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability,” Guangming Daily, November 10, 2017.¹²

This Guangming Daily article appeared one month after the 19th Party Congress — where Military-Civil Fusion joined the National Strategic System — in a newspaper published by the Central Committee, and was written by two experts affiliated with the Military-Civil Fusion Development Research Center at National Defense University. Other credible sources discuss the same concepts, but in my view this article provides the clearest contemporary explanation of how Military-Civil Fusion fits into the Party’s newly emphasized concept of a Unified National Strategic System and Capability. The article’s precise language merits close examination because its logic frames the transformation of Military-Civil Fusion already underway at that moment.

---

2. Military-Civil Fusion inside the Industrial Internet

The industrial internet platform is the “operating system” of the new industrial system.

“Industrial Internet Platform White Paper (2017),” Alliance of the Industrial Internet, November 2017.¹³ (The Alliance of the Industrial Internet operates under the guidance of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.)

The Industrial Internet is not merely an adjacent manufacturing policy; it offers the operating system for making Military-Civil Fusion work at scale.

The Unified National Strategic System and Capability helps explain why both the Industrial Internet and the period 2015–2017 deserve more attention. In precisely the same timeframe that Military-Civil Fusion was elevated to a national development strategy, the Industrial Internet was elevated to a central pillar of national industrial policy. Once Military-Civil Fusion is understood as a national development strategy, the Industrial Internet no longer looks like an adjacent manufacturing program. It looks like a national operating architecture for making that strategy systemic.

What is the Industrial Internet? In simple terms, the Industrial Internet acts as the “central nervous system” for a modernized industrial system.¹⁴ It connects machines, factories, platforms, products, supply chains, data, industrial software, and applications so production can be monitored, coordinated, optimized, and reorganized across an entire industrial system. One phrase is routinely used in Chinese publications of all kinds—official, technical, academic, and commercial—to describe this capability: the comprehensive interconnection and interoperability of “All Production Factors, All Industrial Chains, and All Value Chains.”¹⁵ This capability is specifically seen as a prerequisite to advancing New Type Industrialization, Beijing’s newest framework for building a modernized industrial system.¹⁶

The Industrial Internet is broader than Military-Civil Fusion. It is a national digital-industrial infrastructure program for upgrading civilian manufacturing, strengthening supply chains, improving quality and safety, supporting industrial data systems, advancing Digital China, and building a Cyber Great Power and Manufacturing Great Power.¹⁷ But that breadth is exactly what makes it strategically important. In defense-relevant industries, the same architecture can connect military requirements, defense industry capacity, civilian technologies, private firms, local industrial resources, technical standards, data platforms, and distributed production networks.

Military-Civil Fusion is a strategy, not a single program.¹⁸ It can be implemented through many systems, mechanisms, platforms, and institutions. The Industrial Internet has been described as one of those systems by Chinese experts and officials alike. It is rarely labeled in current public documents as a Military-Civil Fusion program. But the better question is not whether it carries the label. The better question is whether it performs the function.

On that basis, the evidence is strong. China is building the Industrial Internet as a national digital system capable of serving civilian industry, defense industry, and military-relevant production. If that architecture matures and functions as described, it may become one of the most important Military-Civil Fusion systems Beijing has ever developed.

---

3. Military-Civil Fusion as a National Development Strategy

A very practical path to building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability is to improve and perfect the coupling mechanism between the National Development Strategic System and the National Security Strategic System, and to promote the Close Integration of the Military-Civil Fusion Strategy with other national strategies.

Jiang Luming, Wang Weihai, “Building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability,” Guangming Daily, November 10, 2017.¹⁹

Military-Civil Fusion was elevated to a named national development strategy just as the Industrial Internet was elevated as a central pillar of national industrial policy.

3a. Why the Dates are Complicated

The date when Military-Civil Fusion was elevated to a national development strategy is more complicated than it first appears. Credible PRC sources point to at least four dates across 2015, 2016, and 2017. The disagreement is partly methodological: what counts as formal elevation? Xi Jinping’s personal endorsement, Central Committee-level implementation, formal Party-state-military guidance, or inclusion in a Party Congress political report? Each date captures a different stage in the same strategic process.

In tracking this sequence, I follow the State Council Information Office’s published interpretation that the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy emerged between March and October 2015, a period that included Xi Jinping’s leadership endorsement, formal elevation, and Central Committee-level implementation.²⁰ I treat October 2017 not as the first elevation of Military-Civil Fusion, but as the decisive moment when the strategy was further institutionalized inside a newly compiled set of seven national development strategies that would be enshrined in the Party Constitution.

The point of this chronology is not to settle a narrow date dispute. It is to show that by 2017, Military-Civil Fusion had become a system-level national development strategy. That is the context in which the Industrial Internet was elevated to a central pillar of national industrial policy.

3b. Xi’s Push from Preliminary Fusion to Deep Fusion

The 19th Party Congress in October 2017 was the major turning point, but the years leading up to it show the gradual refinement of Xi Jinping’s vision. In March 2013, Xi called for a new “development pattern” featuring Military-Civil Deep Fusion in infrastructure and critical sectors, in order to better coordinate economic construction and national defense construction.²¹ In December 2014, he sharpened the mandate, again calling for deep fusion in infrastructure and critical sectors, but adding that the new pattern must be tailored to the unique requirements of a military theater.²²

On March 12, 2015, Xi Jinping addressed the PLA delegation at the Third Session of the 12th National People’s Congress. Many PRC media accounts implicitly point to this speech as the moment “Military-Civil Fusion Development” was elevated to a national strategy. A Xinhua historical narrative described the speech as the first time Xi explicitly proposed elevating “Military-Civilian Fusion Development” to the level of a national strategy, noting that he devoted a significant portion of his remarks to the concept.²⁴

In the same speech, Xi described Military-Civil Fusion as entering a transition from “preliminary fusion” to “deep fusion.”²⁵ He gave specific requirements for implementing the strategy, including that its “deep development pattern” quickly encompass “All Factors of Production, Multiple Domains, and High Efficiency.”²⁶ He also criticized impediments to the transition, including outdated ideas and concepts; the lack of top-level coordination and management mechanisms; outdated policies, regulations, and operational mechanisms; and insufficient implementation.

3c. From Central Guidance to New Era Strategy

On October 29, 2015, the Fifth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee identified the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy by name, explicitly proposed implementing the strategy, and published a new Party term-of-art (tifa) — “Implement the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy, Achieve Coordinated Development”²⁷ — to socialize its guidance.²⁸

On March 25, 2016, the Central Committee, State Council, and Central Military Commission released “Opinions on the Fused Development of Economic Construction and National Defense Construction,” which specifically called for the deep implementation of the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy.²⁹ Some Chinese academics point to that date as the formal elevation of Military-Civil Fusion to a national strategy.³⁰

In October 2017, the 19th Party Congress marked the culmination of Xi Jinping’s years-long effort to elevate Military-Civil Fusion to a key national priority. The Party Congress placed Military-Civil Fusion among the national development strategies in Xi’s political report,³² enshrined the National Development Strategic System — the new 19th Party Congress compilation of seven national development strategies including Military-Civil Fusion³³ — into the Party Constitution,³⁴ and inaugurated national efforts to form a new “deep development pattern” for Military-Civil Fusion.³⁵ The enhanced status of Military-Civil Fusion after the 19th Party Congress was widely publicized, including through one phrase that appeared across multiple outlets: “Our Country’s Inaugural Year for Deep Development of Military-Civil Fusion.”³⁶

3d. New Meaning for a New Era

“Endowed with new meaning”³⁷ as a national development strategy, Military-Civil Fusion entered a “strategic system” of seven development strategies deemed essential to build a Modernized Socialist Great Power, a new National Rejuvenation goal freshly defined by the 19th Party Congress. Military-Civil Fusion was no longer just about military and economic construction. It was now an important element of the much higher goal of building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.

The 19th Party Congress explicitly incorporated the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy . . . into the “Seven Major [National Development] Strategies” in order to . . . build a Modernized Socialist Great Power in all respects. This clarified the leading, foundational, and overarching position of the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy within the National Strategic System. A very practical path to building the Unified National Strategic System and Capability is to strengthen and perfect the coupling mechanism between the National Development Strategic System and the National Security Strategic System, and to advance the close integration of the Military-Civil Fusion Strategy with other national strategies.

Jiang Luming, Wang Weihai, “Building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability,” Guangming Daily, November 10, 2017.³⁸

This is why the Industrial Internet deserves more attention. Once Military-Civil Fusion is understood as a national development strategy rather than merely a defense procurement or dual-use technology program, it requires systems capable of operating at national scale. The Industrial Internet offers that kind of system: platforms, data, standards, security, industrial networks, and lifecycle coordination across civilian and defense-relevant production.

---

4. One Strategy, Multiple Audiences: Explaining the Industrial Internet

The Industrial Internet is the product of the deep fusion of new-generation information and communication technologies with modern industrial technologies; it serves as an important vehicle for the digitalization, networkization, and intelligentization of the manufacturing sector, and constitutes the commanding heights of the new global round of industrial competition.

“Industrial Internet Platform White Paper (2017),” Alliance of the Industrial Internet, November 30, 2017.³⁹

For New Type Industrialization to succeed across both defense and civilian sectors, the Industrial Internet must succeed first.

By 2020, the Industrial Internet was no longer only a technical concept. It was classified as a Tier Three application model under New Type Infrastructure, as defined by the National Development and Reform Commission in April 2020. It has also been a central element of Digital China since the strategy’s elevation in 2017, and was further embedded in the emerging 14th Five-Year Plan framework following the Fifth Plenum of the 19th Party Congress in October 2020. In 2021, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s (MIIT) Academy of the Industrial Internet described the Industrial Internet as “an important cornerstone of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.”

For a Party historian or theoretician, that chronology works. But the Industrial Internet is a broader state concept, not merely a niche item for study, and Beijing has spent years explaining the Industrial Internet as one strategy to multiple audiences. For experts, the Industrial Internet is a technical architecture. For citizens, it is a way to understand how China will upgrade manufacturing and compete in the digital era. For cadres, it is part of the Party’s broader strategy for New Type Industrialization, Digital China, and National Rejuvenation. For policymakers studying foreign competitors, it is also a contest over platforms, patents, standards, and the future organization of industrial power. Each of these lenses is important for our understanding.

4a. 2017–2020 Policy Acceleration

The educational effort began to accelerate in 2017 and the timing is not accidental. In November 2017, the State Council issued its Guiding Opinion on Deepening “Internet + Advanced Manufacturing” to Develop the Industrial Internet, establishing the opening programmatic document for China’s Industrial Internet development. In June 2018, MIIT followed with the Industrial Internet Development Action Plan (2018–2020).⁴⁰ The plan described 2018–2020 as the startup phase of China’s Industrial Internet construction and stated that this period would have a profound impact on future development. When Premier Li Keqiang raised the term Industrial Internet in a Government Work Report for the first time in March 2019,⁴¹ its status as a media buzzword (热词) rose,⁴² and the Party’s education effort accelerated with it.

But the buzzword was real. The architecture was already moving from concept to infrastructure. By the end of 2019, MIIT had completed national top-level nodes for Industrial Internet identifier resolution in five major cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Chongqing.⁴³ Xinhua described a national top-level node as the core link in the entire identifier-resolution system⁴⁴ and the “neural hub”⁴⁵ supporting the interconnection of entire supply chains—from design to delivery— to the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). Essential parts of the Industrial Internet architecture were already in place, expanding, and in need of broader understanding at all levels.

4b. The Industrial Internet for Citizens

A March 2018 article in Economic Daily titled “How Much Do You Know About the Industrial Internet?” is one example of how the Industrial Internet was introduced to citizens.⁴⁷ The article described the Industrial Internet as the commanding height of competition in the manufacturing sector and a force that would bring “comprehensive, deep-seated, and revolutionary changes to future industrial development, exerting a far-reaching impact on social productivity and the trajectory of human history.” Quoting an MIIT official, it described the Industrial Internet as a new type of network infrastructure for the comprehensive interconnection of people, machines, and objects that would stimulate new business forms and application models for intelligent development. This framing was not narrow factory digitization. It presented China’s path to becoming a Manufacturing Great Power.

An article in People’s Weekly in May 2019 titled “Understanding the Industrial Internet” made the concept more concrete.⁴⁸ Wu Hequan, former vice president and academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, explained that the Industrial Internet is not the consumer Internet applied to factories. The consumer Internet connects people, content, services, and transactions. The Industrial Internet connects equipment, production lines, workshops, factories, enterprises, industrial control systems, suppliers, software platforms, data systems, and ecosystem partners. It must be more reliable, more customized, more secure, and more demanding in latency and performance. Above all, it must fuse information technology with operational technology, making industrial systems networked, data-driven, and intelligentized from inside the production process itself.

4c. The Industrial Internet for Party Cadres

In a December 2024 article titled “What Is the Industrial Internet?,” the Party theoretical journal Qiushi (Seeking Truth) explained the Industrial Internet to members and cadres.⁴⁹ Its formulation was important because it simplified a complex system into five easy-to-remember parts: network is the foundation, identifiers are the identity, platforms are the hub, data is the production factor, and security is the guarantee. That breakdown of the architecture gives the concept its strategic meaning. Networks connect industrial resources. Identifiers make machines, products, components, and data traceable. Platforms gather data, support modeling and analysis, enable industrial applications, and coordinate resources. Data becomes a factor of production. Security protects the system once production becomes networked and data-driven.

4d. Response to Foreign Competition

Chinese media sources also explained the Industrial Internet through the lens of foreign competition. Analysts closely studied GE Predix, Siemens MindSphere, Germany’s Industry 4.0, Japan’s Connected Industries, and European industrial digitalization.⁵⁰ These comparisons placed the Industrial Internet inside a global contest over manufacturing power, industrial platforms, standards, data, and technological leadership.

China did not invent the Industrial Internet concept. GE introduced the term in 2012. Beijing’s response was to absorb, adapt, and nationalize the concept into a Chinese state-directed digital-industrial architecture. A 2019 publication by the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA), produced with assistance from the defense conglomerate China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC),⁵¹ made the competitive stakes explicit.⁵²

CNIPA warned that foreign firms, particularly GE and Siemens, were using technological and industrial advantages to shape Industrial Internet patent positions, creating a “formidable challenge” for China’s development. It raised the possibility that Predix could become the de facto operating-system standard for the Industrial Internet and called for China to accelerate forward-looking patent layout, participate in international standards, link standards development with patent strategy, and seize the technological high ground, dominance, and discourse power of Industrial Internet development.

4e. New Type Industrialization and the Industrial Internet

Beijing was not explaining the Industrial Internet as a factory tool. It explained it as strategic infrastructure for industrial transformation. Across public, expert, Party, and policy audiences, the Industrial Internet was presented as a way to enable New Type Industrialization, upgrade manufacturing, compete over platforms and standards, and reorganize the future of industrial power.

That is why the Industrial Internet appears to “fit” Military-Civil Fusion. The same architecture that can upgrade ordinary manufacturing can also connect defense industry requirements, design, R&D, production, testing, procurement, operation, maintenance, and iterative upgrading across organizational boundaries.

The Industrial Internet is not only a productivity tool. In China’s system, it is strategic infrastructure.

---

5. Military-Civil Fusion Did Not Disappear. It Changed Form.

General Secretary Xi Jinping has explicitly stated the need to thoroughly implement the strategy for the innovative development of the Industrial Internet. “The Guiding Opinion of the State Council on Deepening ‘Internet + Advanced Manufacturing’ to Develop the Industrial Internet” places security assurance on par with network and platform construction, designating them the three major systems of the Industrial Internet.

“Explanation: Guiding Opinion on Strengthening Industrial Internet Security Work,” Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, September 3, 2019.⁵³

The Industrial Internet is not just another place to find Military-Civil Fusion evidence. It is a different form of Military-Civil Fusion implementation.

The Industrial Internet is discussed openly. Its relationship to Military-Civil Fusion is not. From the start, authoritative policy treated networks, platforms, and security assurance as the Industrial Internet’s three major systems. Intentionally or not, that framing may have made the Military-Civil Fusion implications harder to see.

Military-Civil Fusion and its predecessors were public policies from the start. China has long pursued closer integration between the civilian economy, the defense industry base, science and technology resources, and military modernization. Under Xi Jinping, that effort was elevated into a national strategy and became central to China’s National Rejuvenation project.

For several years, the term Military-Civil Fusion appeared frequently in Chinese official documents, media reports, institutional names, development plans, exhibitions, and research programs. It became one of the key concepts foreign analysts used to understand how China sought to mobilize civilian innovation for military power. Then the phrase became politically costly.

At the same time, the Industrial Internet remained highly visible in public discussion, especially when framed through security, Cyber Great Power, and Digital China.

As U.S. concern grew, Military-Civil Fusion became a target of export controls, investment restrictions, visa limitations, and broader strategic scrutiny. Beijing’s public language changed. The term became less visible in public documents, appeared less frequently in authoritative sources, and became harder to track across institutions and projects. In some areas, the label faded even when the underlying logic continued.

That shift led many analysts to search for new evidence of Military-Civil Fusion implementation and outcomes, both qualitatively⁵⁴ and quantitatively.⁵⁵ Some of that evidence, although more opaque, still remains available: patents, academic papers, corporate disclosures, public procurement records, standards activity, and published institutional affiliations. Other evidence requires more careful reconstruction: renamed laboratories, obscured affiliations, concealed defense ties, procurement channels, financial channels, university links, research institutes, and entities supporting the People’s Liberation Army. That work is important. It shows that the disappearance of the phrase does not mean the disappearance of the strategy or its goals.

But there is another question. What if Military-Civil Fusion is not only hidden? What if it is also changing form? If Military-Civil Fusion is increasingly organized through digital infrastructure, industrial platforms, data systems, and supply-chain coordination mechanisms, then looking only for entities, funding channels, research ties, patents, papers, and slogans will miss part of the picture. The key issue is not only which civilian firm helps the military, or which military-linked institution reaches into the civilian economy. It is what kind of system allows civilian and defense resources to be discovered, matched, validated, coordinated, secured, and mobilized across an entire industrial chain — without a public Military-Civil Fusion label.

China’s Industrial Internet is built around networks, platforms, and security. That helps explain why its relationship to Military-Civil Fusion has been so difficult to see: the same architecture that makes industrial resources more connected, visible, and secure can also make military-civil coordination more systemic — and less public.

Part Two of this series will begin to examine the documentary record.

---

I use AI tools to support my editing, research, and translation process. Learn more on my AI Transparency Page.

---

Footnotes

1. “加快发展先进工业技术，加强增材制造、智能机器人、工业互联网等技术研发，提升军工制造数字化、网络化和智能化水平。” See, Zhang Kejian (张克俭), “Striving to Write a New Chapter in the Innovative Development of the National Defense, Science, and Technology Industry in the New Era” (奋力谱写新时代国防科技工业创新发展新篇章), SASTIND, May 18, 2018. SASTIND Director Zhang Kejian named three technologies, but only the industrial internet will be covered here. For more information on Military-Civil Fusion elements in China’s humanoid robot industry, see Sunny Cheung, “New Military–Civil Fusion Body for PRC Robotics Ecosystem,” Jamestown China Brief, December 18, 2025. For more information on general progress in China’s additive manufacturing industry, see Michael Molitch-Hou, “China’s 3D Printing Sector Is One Of The World’s Fastest Growing,” Forbes, May 30, 2024. ↩︎
2. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian recently made the following comment in response to a journalist’s question on the U.S. Department of War’s release of the updated Section 1260H list of Chinese military companies: “China firmly opposes the U.S. overstretching the concept of national security and formulating various types of discriminatory lists to go after Chinese businesses,” see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on June 9, 2026,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 9, 2026. ↩︎
3. “我国军民融合已经成为党的意志、国家行为…” See, Ji Wenbo (姬文波), “The Deepening and Expansion of the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy Since the 18th Party Congress” (党的十八大以来军民融合发展战略的深化与拓展), National Defense (国防), December 8, 2017. ↩︎
4. A number of Western analysts recognized early the importance of the Industrial Internet in China and its link to defense industry or Military-Civil Fusion. See for instance, Brady Helwig, “Recalibrating the Defense Industrial Base for Systems Competition,” The Alexander Hamilton Society, September 16, 2025; Emily de La Bruyère, Doug Strub, and Jonathon Marek, eds., “China’s Digital Ambitions A Global Strategy to Supplant the Liberal Order,” NBR Special Report #97, March 1, 2022; Alex Stone and Peter Wood, “China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy: A View from Chinese Strategists,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, June 15, 2020, who noted, “The defense conglomerates built Internet service platforms to promote the sharing of military and civilian resources and collaborative innovation among industries. For example, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation established an “Internet + Smart Manufacturing” service platform called CASICloud [航天云网].” More recently, CPA Jim’s Substack highlighted the role of the Alliance of the Industrial Internet (AII) as a “state-aligned coordination mechanism linking military industry, central SOEs, research institutes, and foreign firms.” See, “The Alliance You’re Not Supposed to Notice,” CPA Jim Substack, January 27, 2026. Perhaps the earliest recognition was by Jeffrey Ding, who highlighted the emergence of CASICloud as a CASIC-subsidiary run cloud platform for the industrial internet, see Jeffrey Ding, “ChinAI #70: CASICloud and the Industrial Internet,” ChinaAI Substack, October 14, 2019. ↩︎
5. “国家发展战略.” For a comprehensive analysis of China’s seven national development strategies including Military-Civil Fusion with a special focus on Comprehensive National Power, see Erik R. Quam, “CNP Part II: Seven National Development Strategies,” in Jamestown China Brief, September 26, 2025. ↩︎
6. “国家战略体系.” For comprehensive analyses of China’s Integrated/Unified National Strategic System, see Howard Wang, “China Plans for ‘Total War’: Developing the Capacity to Defeat the ‘Strong Enemy’ of the United States,” Journal of Contemporary China, April 21, 2026; Liza Tobin, Addis Goldman, and Katherine Kurata, “System by Design: The Evolution of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy,” in “The PLA’s Long March Toward A World-Class Military,” National Bureau of Asia Research, October 27, 2025; and Tai Ming Cheung, “National Strategic Integration: How China Is Building Its Strategic Power,” University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), October 26, 2023. ↩︎
7. As described in the 2022 and 2017 amended versions of the Chinese Communist Party Constitution. ↩︎
8. “Guangming Daily is a major ideological and cultural newspaper published by the Central Committee with intellectuals as its primary readership… with a daily circulation exceeding one million copies,” according to its description on the Guangming Daily website. (光明日报… 是中共中央主办，以知识分子为主要读者对象的思想文化大报… 报纸发行量达100多万份。) ↩︎
9. “国家战略体系是为实现国家利益而形成的有机战略系统。国家总体战略居于最顶端，其下为国家发展战略和国家安全战略，国家发展战略分为政治、经济、文化、社会、生态等各领域的战略，国家安全战略分为各安全领域战略及军事战略等。” See, Jiang Luming, Wang Weihai ( 姜鲁鸣, 王伟海), “Building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability” (构建一体化的国家战略体系和能力), Guangming Daily, November 10, 2017. ↩︎
10. The standard Western translation of “一体化国家战略体系” is “Integrated National Strategic System.” For the remainder of this essay, I translate the same Chinese term as “Unified National Strategic System” to better reflect the specialized use of “一体化” in this context, maintain distance from other adjacent Chinese terms including some that are used in this essay that are routinely translated as “integrated” and carry a different meaning, and to maintain consistency across this website when translating other compounds using “一体化” in a similar role. ↩︎
11. “紧密结合,” see, Jiang Luming, Wang Weihai ( 姜鲁鸣, 王伟海), “Building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability” (构建一体化的国家战略体系和能力), Guangming Daily, November 10, 2017. ↩︎
12. “国家战略能力则是运用国家战略资源达成国家战略目标的能力，具体体现为国家的经济能力、军事能力、科技能力、组织动员能力、制度变革能力、战略谋划能力以及民族凝聚力等。国家战略体系和能力是一个有机整体，是国家战略意愿与战略能力的统一。构建完整有效的国家战略体系，目的在于形成强大的国家战略能力进而实现国家战略意愿。” See, Jiang Luming, Wang Weihai ( 姜鲁鸣, 王伟海), “Building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability” (构建一体化的国家战略体系和能力), Guangming Daily, November 10, 2017. ↩︎
13. “工业互联网平台是新工业体系的“操作系统。” See, “Industrial Internet Platform White Paper (2017)” (工业互联网平台白皮书 2017年), Alliance of the Industrial Internet (工业互联网产业联盟), November 30, 2017. For a detailed study on the Alliance of the Industrial Internet, see “The Alliance You’re Not Supposed to Notice,” CPA Jim Substack, January 27, 2026. ↩︎
14. See, William Payne, “China shifts gears in industrial policy,” IoT M2M Council, November 19, 2015. The most comprehensive study of China’s Industrial Internet is by Rebecca Arcesati, Anna Holzmann, Yishu Mao, Manlai Nyamdorj, Kristin Shi-Kupfer, Kai von Carnap, and Claudia Wessling, “China’s Digital Platform Economy: Assessing Developments Towards Industry 4.0,” Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), May 29, 2020. For a general overview of the Industrial Internet in China see, Jiang Chunxiao et al, “Rethinking Development and Major Research Plans of the Industrial Internet in China,” Fundamental Research, November 03, 2023; and Yi Wu, “Industrial Internet in China: How Policies Enable Latest Stage of Industry 4.0,” China Briefing, October 13, 2023, and Matt Sheehan, “Remaking ‘Made in China’: Beijing’s Industrial Internet Ambitions,” MacroPolo, February 21, 2021. ↩︎
15. “全要素、全产业链、全价值链” (All Production Factors, All Industrial Chains, and All Value Chains). See for example, “Glossary of Terms from the “14th Five-Year Plan” Outline: No. 58 | Industrial Internet” (“十四五”规划《纲要》名词解释之58|工业互联网), National Development and Reform Commission, December 24, 2021. ↩︎
16. For useful background on New Type Industrialization see, Kendra Schaefer and Cory Combs, “‘New Industrialization’: The Industrial Upgrading Theory Driving China’s Advanced Manufacturing Policy,” CSIS Interpret: China, June 14, 2024; Huang Qunhui, “Promoting High-Quality Development Throughout the Process of New Industrialization,” Qiushi, January 05, 2024; and Giulia Interesse, “Understanding China’s New-Type Industrialization: An Explainer,” China Briefing, November 29, 2023. ↩︎
17. The relationship between the Industrial Internet and building a Cyber Great Power and Manufacturing Great Power is frequently stated in public. See for instance, “Miao Wei Attended the Founding Conference of the Alliance of the Industrial Internet and Delivered a Speech,” Alliance of the Industrial Internet, March 09, 2017. ↩︎
18. China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy has been studied extensively outside China. This short list of recent English-language analysis, listed chronologically, offers a comprehensive look at the current state and ongoing evolution of China’s Military-Civil Fusion: Ryan D. Martinson, “The Staged Death of China’s Military-Civil Fusion,” The Diplomat, April 25, 2026; Liza Tobin, Addis Goldman, and Katherine Kurata, “System by Design: The Evolution of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy,” in The PLA’s Long March Toward A World-Class Military, The National Bureau of Asian Research, October 27, 2025; Cole McFaul, Sam Bresnick and Daniel Chou, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Military-Civil Fusion: How the PLA Mobilizes Civilian AI for Strategic Advantage,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2025; Muhammed Can and Alena Vieira, “The Chinese Military-Civil Fusion Strategy: A State Action Theory Perspective,” The International Spectator, June 13, 2022; Elsa B. Kania and Lorand Laskai, “Myths and Realities of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy,” Center for New American Security, January 21, 2021; Richard A. Bitzinger, “China’s Shift from Civil-Military Integration to Military-Civil Fusion,” Asia Policy, January 2021; Alex Stone and Peter Wood, “China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy: A View from Chinese Strategists,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, June 15, 2020; and Audrey Fritz, “China’s Evolving Conception of Civil-Military Collaboration,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2, 2019. ↩︎
19. “构建一体化的国家战略体系和能力，一个很现实的路径就是健全和完善国家发展战略体系与国家安全战略体系之间的耦合机制，促进军民融合战略与其他国家战略的紧密结合。” See, Jiang Luming, Wang Weihai ( 姜鲁鸣, 王伟海), “Building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability” (构建一体化的国家战略体系和能力), Guangming Daily, November 10, 2017. ↩︎
20. See, “Strategy for Military-Civil Fusion” (军民融合发展战略), State Council Information Office, July 11, 2019. Note: The title is incorrectly translated as “Strategy for Military-Civil Integration” in the State Council Information Office document. ↩︎
21. “努力形成基础设施和重要领域军民深度融合的发展格局,” comments made by Xi Jinping to the PLA Delegation at the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2013. See, “Xi Jinping at the Two Sessions: Three Key Highlights of His Systematic Elaboration on Civil-Military Fusion” (习近平的两会时间：系统阐述军民融合发展的三个看点), Xinhua, March 13, 2015. ↩︎
22. “构建具有时代特色、符合战区特点的军民融合新格局.” This is guidance provided by Xi Jinping during his inspection of Nanjing Military Region in December 2014. See, “Xi Jinping at the Two Sessions: Three Key Highlights of His Systematic Elaboration on Civil-Military Fusion” (习近平的两会时间：系统阐述军民融合发展的三个看点), Xinhua, March 13, 2015. ↩︎
23. See “Deeply Implement the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy” (深入实施军民融合发展战略) People’s Daily, Page 1, March 13, 2015. ↩︎
24. The historical narrative in Xinhua describes Xi’s “important speech” that day to the PLA delegation at the Third Session of the 12th National People’s Congress, noting that “While Xi Jinping has addressed this issue on numerous previous occasions, today marked the first time he explicitly proposed ‘elevating Military-Civilian Fusion Development to the level of a national strategy,’ devoting a significant portion of his speech to elaborating on the concept” (此前，习近平在多个场合谈到这一问题，但今天是第一次明确提出“把军民融合发展上升为国家战略”，并用较长篇幅进行了论述). See, “Xi Jinping at the Two Sessions: Three Key Highlights of His Systematic Elaboration on Civil-Military Fusion” (习近平的两会时间：系统阐述军民融合发展的三个看点), Xinhua, March 13, 2015. ↩︎
25. “我国军民融合发展刚进入由初步融合向深度融合的过渡阶段,” see “Deeply Implement the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy” (深入实施军民融合发展战略) People’s Daily, Page 1, March 13, 2015. ↩︎
26. “加快形成全要素、多领域、高效益的军民融合深度发展格局,” see “Deeply Implement the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy” (深入实施军民融合发展战略) People’s Daily, Page 1, March 13, 2015. ↩︎
27. “实施军民深度融合发展战略，实现协调发展,” see Huang Yue (黄玥), “Fifth Plenary Session: You Should Pay Attention To These New Tifa” (五中全会：你该注意这些新提法), Xinhua Online, October 30, 2015. ↩︎
28. “Advance the fused development of economic construction and national defense construction; uphold balancing development and security, and unifying national prosperity with military strength; implement the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy, and forge an All-Factor, Multiple-Domain, High-Efficiency Development Pattern for Military-Civil Deep Fusion” (推动经济建设和国防建设融合发展，坚持发展和安全兼顾、富国和强军统一，实施军民融合发展战略，形成全要素、多领域、高效益的军民深度融合发展格局). See, “Communiqué of the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party” (中国共产党第十八届中央委员会第五次全体会议公报) Chinese Communist Party Members Network, October 29, 2015. Full translation available at China Copyright and Media. ↩︎
29. “深入实施军民融合发展战略,” see, “Central Committee, State Council, and Central Military Commission Release 《Opinions on the Fused Development of Economic Construction and National Defense Construction》” (中共中央 国务院 中央军委印发《关于经济建设和国防建设融合发展的意见》), Xinhua, July 21, 2016. The Opinions were approved on March 25, 2016 and released in July 2016. ↩︎
30. See, for instance, Northwest University (Xian) Associate Professor Li Xiaohua [李晓华], “Economic Interpretation of the Development of Military-Civilian Fusion” [军民深度融合发展的经济学解释], People’s Forum Academic Frontier [人民论坛 学术前沿], November 28, 2017. ↩︎
31. See, “Major Policies on Military-Civil Fusion Set for Release, Sparking a New Wave of Defense Industry Reform” (多项军民融合重磅政策将出台 军工改革再掀浪潮), China Securities Journal (中国证券报), February 16, 2017. ↩︎
32. See, “Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress,” Xinhua, October 18, 2017. ↩︎
33. The seven development strategies — National Invigoration Through Science and Education 科教兴国; Talent Great Power人才强国; Innovation-Driven 创新驱动; Rural Revitalization 乡村振兴; Regional Coordination 区域协调; Sustainable Development 可持续发展; and Military-Civil Fusion 军民融合 — first compiled and cited in the 19th Party Congress Political Report and then appearing in the 2017 Party Constitution as adopted at the 19th Party Congress, and remaining intact in the 2022 Party Constitution as adopted at the 20th Party Congress. For a comprehensive analysis of China’s national development strategies, including the constitutional elevation of Military-Civil Fusion, with a special focus on their relationship to Comprehensive National Power, see Erik R. Quam, “CNP Part II: Seven National Development Strategies,” in Jamestown China Brief, September 26, 2025. ↩︎
34. See the 2022 and 2017 amended versions of the Chinese Communist Party Constitution. ↩︎
35. Although clearly articulated in Xi Jinping’s Political Report to the 19th Party Congress, Xi repeated for emphasis his central direction regarding Military-Civil Fusion in his “important speech” at the First Plenary of the newly created Central Commission for the Development of Civil-Military Fusion on March 02, 2018: “The 19th Party Congress emphasized the need to resolutely implement the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy, form a deep development pattern for Military-Civil Fusion, and build a Unified National Strategic System and Capability” (党的十九大强调要坚定实施军民融合发展战略，形成军民融合深度发展格局，构建一体化的国家战略体系和能力). See, “Xi Jinping: Resolutely Implement the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy and Blaze a New Path for Military-Civil Fusion Deep Development in the New Era.” (习近平：坚定实施军民融合发展战略 开创新时代军民融合深度发展新局面), Xinhua, March 02, 2018. ↩︎
36. “我国军民融合深度发展元年,” see for instance, “What New Changes Can We Expect From Deep Development of Military-Civil Fusion in Our Country in 2018?” (2018，我国军民融合深度发展将会呈现哪些新变化), China Military Online (中国军网), January 27, 2018. The events most highly publicized in this context were: elevating Military-Civil Fusion as one of seven national development strategies; enshrining Military-Civil Fusion in the Party Constitution as one of seven national development strategies; creating the Central Commission for the Development of Civil-Military Fusion and convening two plenary sessions; the State Council issuing its Opinion on Advancing the Deep Development of Military-Civil Fusion in National Defense Science and Technology Industry (关于推动国防科技工业军民融合深度发展的意见) in December 2017; and the Ministry of Science and Technology and Central Military Commission’s Science and Technology Commission jointly issuing the 13th Five-Year Special Plan for S&T and Military-Civil Fusion Development (十三五”科技军民融合发展专项规划) in August 2017. ↩︎
37. “新的时代内涵,” see “Strategy for Sustainable Development,” State Council Information Office, July 11, 2019. ↩︎
38. “党的十九大明确把军民融合发展战略… 一道纳入… 全面建设社会主义现代化强国的“七大战略”，明确了军民融合发展战略在国家战略体系中的引领性、基础性和全局性地位。构建一体化的国家战略体系和能力，一个很现实的路径就是健全和完善国家发展战略体系与国家安全战略体系之间的耦合机制，促进军民融合战略与其他国家战略的紧密结合。” See, Jiang Luming, Wang Weihai ( 姜鲁鸣, 王伟海), “Building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability” (构建一体化的国家战略体系和能力), Guangming Daily, November 10, 2017. ↩︎
39. “工业互联网是新一代信息通信技术与现代工业技术深度融合的产物，是制造业数字化、网络化、智能化的重要载体，也是全球新一轮产业竞争的制高点。” See, “Industrial Internet Platform White Paper (2017)” (工业互联网平台白皮书 2017年), Alliance of the Industrial Internet (工业互联网产业联盟), November 30, 2017. ↩︎
40. “Industrial Internet Development Action Plan (2018–2020)” (工业互联网发展行动计划 2018-2020年), Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (工信部), Approved on May 31, 2018; Issued on June 8, 2018. ↩︎
41. “We will create Industrial Internet platforms and expand Intelligent Plus initiatives to facilitate transformation and upgrading in manufacturing.” (打造工业互联网平台，拓展“智能+”，为制造业转型升级赋能). See, “Full Text: Li Keqiang 2019 Government Work Report” (李克强2019年政府工作报告), China.org, March 21, 2019. ↩︎
42. See, for instance, “During this year’s “Two Sessions,” “Industrial Internet” emerged as a buzzword and was written into the Government Work Report” (在今年的全国两会上，“工业互联网”成为“热词”并写入政府工作报告) in “Accelerating Deployment to Empower the Transformation and Upgrading of Manufacturing: What Exactly is the Industrial Internet?” (加速布局为制造业转型升级赋能 工业互联网究竟是怎样一张“网”), Economic Daily (经济日报), March 19, 2019. ↩︎
43. See, “National Top-Level Node (Chongqing) for Industrial Internet Identification and Resolution Launched in Chongqing” (工业互联网标识解析国家顶级节点（重庆）在渝启动), Xinhua (新华社), December 01, 2018. ↩︎
44. The Industrial Internet Identification and Resolution System serves as the digital “Domain Name System” for the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). It assigns unique digital identities to physical and virtual objects, mapping them to specific locations or data to enable seamless supply chain traceability, intelligent manufacturing, and secure asset management across disparate systems. See, Wang Dajiang et al, “Industrial Internet Identity Resolution+5G Full Connection Digital Factory Research,” Applied Sciences, April 14, 2023. ↩︎
45. “神经枢纽,” see, “National Top-Level Node (Chongqing) for Industrial Internet Identification and Resolution Launched in Chongqing” (工业互联网标识解析国家顶级节点（重庆）在渝启动), Xinhua (新华社), December 01, 2018. ↩︎
46. See, “Looking at the New Highlights of China’s Development from the Perspective of ‘Digital China'” (从“数字中国”看中国发展新亮点), Xinhua (新华社), May 10, 2019. ↩︎
47. See “How Much Do You Know About the Industrial Internet?” (工业互联网 你知道多少), Economic Daily (经济日报), March 28, 2018. ↩︎
48. See, Wu Hequan (邬贺铨), Former Vice President and Academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (中国工程院原副院长、院士), “Understanding the Industrial Internet” (认识工业互联网), People’s Weekly (人民周刊), May 22, 2019. ↩︎
49. Ke Wen (柯文), “What is the Industrial Internet” (什么是工业互联网), Qiushi, December 08, 2024. ↩︎
50. For an interesting review of foreign efforts to build the Industrial Internet by an economist at the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT) who participated in drafting several of China’s key policy documents on the Industrial Internet in 2018, see Wang Xinyi (王欣怡), “Governments Worldwide Actively Advance the Development of the Industrial Internet” (各国政府积极推进工业互联网发展), Alliance of the Industrial Internet (工业互联网产业联盟), April 19, 2019. ↩︎
51. CASIC played a major role in the early development of China’s Industrial Internet, as will be described in detail later in this article. According to the BaiduWiki, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC; 中国航天科工集团有限公司, commonly abbreviated 中国航天科工 or 中国航天) is a centrally administered state-owned aerospace and defense conglomerate. Its predecessor was the Fifth Research Academy of the Ministry of National Defense, established in October 1956. Its core business focuses on the research, development, and production of missile weapon systems, aerospace products, and satellite application equipment. It operates a complete research and production system for air and missile defense weapon systems, cruise missile weapon systems, and ballistic missile systems. ↩︎
52. See, “Analysis and Insights into GE’s Patent Layout for Industrial Internet Technologies” (GE公司工业互联网技术专利布局分析与启示), China National Intellectual Property Administration (国家知识产权局）with CASIC (航天科工基地) involvement noted in the source, May 29, 2019. ↩︎
53. “习近平总书记明确提出，要深入实施工业互联网创新发展战略。《国务院关于深化“互联网+先进制造业”发展工业互联网的指导意见》将安全保障与网络、平台建设并列为工业互联网三大体系之一。” See, “Explanation: Guiding Opinion on Strengthening Industrial Internet Security Work” (解读 加强工业互联网安全工作的指导意见), Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (工信部), September 3, 2019. ↩︎
54. See, for example, Ryan D. Martinson, “The Staged Death of China’s Military-Civil Fusion,” The Diplomat, April 25, 2026. ↩︎
55. See, for example, Jeffrey Ding, Working Paper April 2025, “The Best of Both Worlds? Benchmarking China’s Civil-Military Integration Efforts.” ↩︎