On November 27, 2017, the State Council issued its “Guiding Opinion on Deepening “Internet + Advanced Manufacturing” to Develop the Industrial Internet,” proposing development goals across three future stages: By 2025, Industrial Internet network infrastructure covering all regions and industries will be basically completed; the Industrial Internet Identifier Resolution System will be continuously improved and rolled out at scale; and an internationally competitive infrastructure and industrial system will be basically established. By 2035, internationally leading Industrial Internet network infrastructure and platforms will be built; the Industrial Internet will see comprehensive, deep application, fostering innovation-led capabilities in industries with a competitive edge and achieving international leadership in key sectors. By the middle of the century, the Industrial Internet’s capacity for innovative development, its technology-industry system, and the depth of its fused application will reach advanced international levels, with comprehensive strength ranking among the world’s best.
“State Council Outlines “Three-Step” Goal for Industrial Internet Development,” Economic Reference, November 28, 2017.1
Military-Civil Fusion is changing form where strategy becomes infrastructure.
That is the bottom line of this series.
Military-Civil Fusion has not disappeared. It has not become less important. But it is becoming harder to understand if analysts look only for the old markers: formal labels, named institutions, visible procurement channels, technology-transfer programs, or individual firms with obvious defense ties. Those still matter. They are no longer enough.
This series has traced a different pattern. Part One examined the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy as a whole-of-nation strategy for fusing innovation, industry, and capability across the full range of military and civilian domains. Part Two followed the public policy trail linking Military-Civil Fusion to the Industrial Internet. Part Three showed defense industry actors and Military-Civil Fusion service providers appearing inside Industrial Internet platform development. Part Four widened the lens to the Industrial Internet as a dual-use ecosystem.
Part Five draws the conclusion. Military-Civil Fusion is changing form from a visible strategy and technology-transfer concept into a platform-based industrial architecture. The Industrial Internet is one place where that change becomes visible. It turns firms, platforms, data systems, identifiers, industrial software, supply chains, standards, equipment, and lifecycle-management tools into mechanisms for making civilian and defense-relevant resources easier to find, connect, adapt, secure, and use.
That does not mean everything in China is automatically military. It does not mean every Industrial Internet project is a defense project. Dual-use ambiguity exists in every advanced industrial economy. The difference is that China is trying to systematize that ambiguity through Party-state strategy, Military-Civil Fusion, Digital China, and state-coordinated industrial infrastructure.
That is what makes China’s Industrial Internet different from industrial internet development in the United States or other market economies. The technologies may look familiar: industrial IoT, digital twins, cloud platforms, smart manufacturing, data systems, and supply-chain tools. The system logic is different. In China, these technologies are being embedded inside a Unified National Strategic System and Capability designed to link development and security, civilian modernization and defense construction, economic upgrading and mobilization capacity.
The current impact is not a completed national system. The evidence does not prove that Beijing can make every part work as designed. But the architecture is real enough to analyze. It already changes what analysts should watch: not only Military-Civil Fusion labels, but the platforms, data layers, identifier-resolution systems, sectoral Industrial Internet applications, cloud-connected equipment, security systems, and lifecycle tools that make industrial capabilities more visible and easier to coordinate.
To understand the next stage of China’s Military-Civil Fusion, we should not only ask where the label appears.
We should ask where the operating system is being built.
Article Roadmap
This essay is the final part in a five-part series that examines the historical linkages between the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy and the buildout of the Industrial Internet in the period from 2015 to 2020.
Part Five of this series has seven main sections:
The complete five-part series establishes a historical baseline. Once that baseline is in place, future essays will dive deeper into the 2015–2020 period and separately examine accelerating developments in both technology and policy from 2021 to the present — including AI + Industrial Internet.
1. Where Strategy Becomes Infrastructure
Implementation of the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy is a major achievement resulting from China’s long-term exploration of the laws governing the coordinated development of economic construction and national defense construction.
“Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy,” State Council Information Office, July 11, 2019.2
Military-Civil Fusion is becoming harder to understand through labels alone.
The strategy is moving into a different layer of China’s industrial system. It is entering platforms, data systems, identifier-resolution networks, industrial software, cloud-connected equipment, supply-chain tools, security systems, and lifecycle-management infrastructure. In that form, Military-Civil Fusion becomes less visible as a political phrase and more embedded as an operating capability.
The Industrial Internet is difficult to analyze precisely because it does not fit neatly into the categories normally used to study Military-Civil Fusion. It is not a weapons program. It is not a single procurement channel. It is not a defense laboratory, military university, or front company. It is a national industrial infrastructure program. Most of its applications are civilian, commercial, developmental, and industrial.
That civilian scale is not separate from its military-civil significance. In China’s system, the most powerful fusion mechanisms are often the ones broad enough to serve the civilian economy, but structured enough to support defense-industrial requirements when needed. The Industrial Internet is significant because the same architecture that supports civilian modernization can also make defense-relevant industrial capacity more visible, connected, and usable.
This creates the key analytical problem. Asking whether the Industrial Internet is always labeled Military-Civil Fusion will miss much of the evidence. Asking whether every Industrial Internet project is military will overstate the case. The better question is functional: can the architecture perform Military-Civil Fusion work?
Can it connect military-relevant requirements with civilian industrial capability? Can it help identify suppliers, technologies, standards, data, equipment, and production capacity across regions and sectors? Can it support defense-industrial manufacturing in shipbuilding, aviation, aerospace, electronics, ordnance, nuclear, and other strategic industries? Can it make distributed civilian capacity more visible, usable, and mobilizable?
The evidence reviewed in this series points to a clear answer: China is building toward that capability.
That is where strategy becomes infrastructure. Military-Civil Fusion begins as a national strategy. It is translated into policy guidance. It enters implementation structures. It appears in platform development. It expands into ecosystem logic. Eventually, the strategy becomes harder to see because it is no longer confined to the label. It is embedded in the systems that make industrial capabilities easier to find, connect, adapt, secure, and use.
This is why the disappearance of explicit Military-Civil Fusion language can be misleading. The words may become less visible while the mechanisms become more embedded. A strategy can move from labels and institutions into infrastructure, platforms, standards, and data systems. In that form, it is harder to track, but potentially more consequential.
That is the foundation for Part Five. The final question is not whether every Industrial Internet document says Military-Civil Fusion. Most will not. The question is whether the Industrial Internet helps make Military-Civil Fusion operational through platforms, data systems, industrial infrastructure, and coordination mechanisms.
2. What the Series Has Shown: Four Layers of Evidence
A very practical path to building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability is to improve and perfect the coupling mechanism between the National Development Strategic System and the National Security Strategic System, and to promote the close integration of the Military-Civil Fusion Strategy with other national strategies.
Jiang Luming, Wang Weihai, “Building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability,” Guangming Daily, November 10, 2017.3
The Industrial Internet–Military-Civil Fusion connection becomes clearer when viewed through four layers: strategy, policy, platforms, and ecosystem development.
This series has not argued that the Industrial Internet is simply another name for Military-Civil Fusion. It has argued something more specific: the Industrial Internet provides a platform-based architecture through which Military-Civil Fusion can become more operational, more embedded, and less dependent on visible slogans or formal labels.
The evidence appears in four layers.
The first layer is strategic. Part One established that the formally titled Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy is not merely China’s version of civil-military integration. It is a whole-of-nation strategy for fusing innovation, industry, and capability across the full range of military and civilian domains. That distinction changes how the later evidence should be read. In China’s system, civilian industrial modernization and defense capability building are not always separate policy tracks. They are increasingly designed to reinforce each other.
The second layer is documentary. Part Two showed that Military-Civil Fusion and the Industrial Internet were connected in public central guidance by late 2017. The evidence was not hidden, but it was dispersed across policy documents, work plans, institutional arrangements, and sectoral references. That dispersion made the connection easy to miss. It also showed how Military-Civil Fusion can begin changing form: not always as a headline label, but as a function embedded inside implementation systems.
The third layer is platform development. Part Three showed defense industry actors and Military-Civil Fusion service providers appearing inside China’s Industrial Internet platform boom. CASICloud, CSSC Smart-IC, SYSWARE, NORINCO, and China Industrial Cloud Network were not the same kind of platform. But together they showed how Military-Civil Fusion could become a service model for making defense-relevant resources, industrial knowledge, production capacity, and supply-chain data more visible, searchable, matchable, and usable across organizational boundaries.
The fourth layer is ecosystem development. Part Four widened the lens from individual platforms to the broader Industrial Internet ecosystem. SASTIND treated the Industrial Internet as relevant to defense industry modernization. Industrial Internet work plans placed the defense-industrial bureaucracy inside coordination structures. A 2023 Chinese paper proposed a Military-Civil Fusion Industrial Internet Service Platform. Shipbuilding showed how platforms, identifier resolution, lifecycle data, industrial applications, and state coordination could converge in a major military-civil industry.
Taken together, these four layers support the core conclusion of the series. Military-Civil Fusion is not only a strategy, a slogan, or a set of technology-transfer channels. It is also becoming an architecture. The Industrial Internet does not have to carry the Military-Civil Fusion label at every point to perform Military-Civil Fusion functions. If it makes civilian and defense-relevant resources easier to identify, connect, coordinate, secure, and mobilize, then the function is already present.
This is why Part Five focuses on infrastructure. Strategy explains the ambition. Policy guidance shows the direction. Platform cases reveal the mechanism. Ecosystem evidence shows the architecture taking shape. The question now is what that architecture means for understanding China’s Military-Civil Fusion today and for watching where it goes next.
3. Does This Mean Everything Is Dual-Use?
The Military-Civil Dual-Use Industrial Internet Empowerment Platform is rooted in the National Defense Industry, has accumulated deep industrial knowledge, and features three core applications: a National Defense Industry Innovation Platform, an Industrial Internet Platform, and an Industrial Development Empowerment Center … The National Defense Industry Innovation Platform’s innovative “Internet Plus” model actively promotes “civilian participation in military” and “military-to-civilian” services. By leveraging the technology and market advantages of partner organizations, it provides leading private and military enterprises with precise technical services, market consulting, project matching, research grant applications, and other support…
“Platform Introduction,” Beijing Hangxin Jiahe Technology Co. Ltd, Accessed June 24, 2026.4
China is trying to make dual-use ambiguity more systemic.
Dual-use ambiguity exists in every advanced industrial economy. Civilian technologies can support military needs. Defense technologies can enter civilian markets. Commercial firms can become defense suppliers. Industrial capacity can become strategically important in a crisis. None of that is unique to China.
The difference is the system design.
In China, Military-Civil Fusion is not simply a procurement reform or a technology-transfer slogan. It is a national strategy for lowering barriers between military and civilian resources, national development and national security, economic construction and defense construction. That does not make every firm, platform, technology, or Industrial Internet project military. But it does change how those things should be analyzed.
The right question is not whether everything is dual-use. That question is too broad to be useful. The better question is whether China is building systems that make civilian and defense-relevant resources easier to identify, connect, evaluate, adapt, secure, and mobilize. The evidence in this series suggests that it is.
This is where the Industrial Internet changes the analysis. It does not erase the distinction between civilian and military industry. Many applications remain civilian, commercial, and developmental. But the Industrial Internet can make the boundary more permeable by connecting firms, equipment, data, suppliers, standards, platforms, and production capacity across sectors and regions.
The direction also runs both ways. Much of the discussion of Military-Civil Fusion focuses on civilian-to-military transfer: civilian firms, technologies, and industrial capacity supporting defense needs. But the Party’s design is broader. Defense industry technologies, standards, production methods, management practices, and industrial discipline can also feed back into civilian upgrading. Military-Civil Fusion is designed to support national defense and broader industrial modernization at the same time.
That is why Part One frames the whole series. The formally titled Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy is not just China’s version of Western civil-military integration. It is one part of a Unified National Strategic System and Capability in which development and security are designed to reinforce each other. In that system, dual-use ambiguity is not only a feature of modern technology. It becomes something the Party-state tries to organize.
So the answer is no: not everything in China is automatically military. But the old civilian-versus-military distinction is no longer enough. The more important question is how China’s platforms, data systems, industrial networks, and coordination mechanisms make civilian and defense-relevant capabilities more connectable. That is where the strategic significance lies.
4. Why China’s Industrial Internet Is Different
The fusion of 5G and the Industrial Internet will accelerate the construction of Digital China and Smart Society, accelerate the course of China’s New Type Industrialization, inject new momentum in China’s economic growth, and create new opportunities for development in a global economy overshadowed by the pandemic.
“Xi Jinping Sends a Congratulatory Message to the 2020 China 5G+Industrial Internet Conference,” Xinhua, November 20, 2020.5
The technologies are familiar. The system logic is different.
The United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and other advanced economies all have industrial internet technologies. They have industrial IoT, digital twins, cloud manufacturing, smart factories, advanced industrial software, supply-chain platforms, defense innovation programs, and dual-use technology ecosystems. China did not invent the idea that civilian technology can have military relevance, or that industrial data can improve manufacturing performance.
The difference is not the technology category. The difference is the system design. In market economies, industrial internet technologies usually develop through firms, markets, standards bodies, research partnerships, defense procurement, industrial alliances, venture capital, and government incentives. In China, those same kinds of technologies are being embedded inside a Party-state strategic system designed to link national development and national security, civilian modernization and defense construction, economic upgrading and mobilization capacity.
China’s Industrial Internet operates inside a different strategic environment. It has been built alongside Military-Civil Fusion, Made in China 2025, New Type Infrastructure, Digital China, Smart Society, Cyber Great Power, and the broader push to build a Unified National Strategic System and Capability. These strategies have different goals, but they point in the same direction: making industrial resources, data, infrastructure, innovation, production capacity, and security capabilities more visible, connected, governable, and usable by the Party-state.
That is why Part One of this series is essential. The formally titled Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy is not simply China’s version of Western civil-military integration. It is a whole-of-nation strategy for fusing innovation, industry, and capability across the full range of military and civilian domains. When the Industrial Internet develops inside that system, it becomes a different strategic object than industrial internet development in a market economy.
The same technologies can therefore have different strategic meaning. A smart factory in the United States may improve productivity, reduce waste, and strengthen supply-chain resilience. A smart factory in China can do those things too. But inside China’s Party-state system, the same factory data, equipment connectivity, platform access, and supply-chain visibility can also become part of a larger architecture for industrial coordination, defense-relevant mobilization, and national strategic capacity.
This does not mean China’s system will automatically work. State coordination can create fragmentation, duplication, bureaucratic friction, weak incentives, and security risks. The Party may describe a system more integrated than the one that actually exists. The important point is not that Beijing has already solved every implementation problem. The point is that the Industrial Internet is being developed inside a political and strategic framework designed to make such integration possible.
That is the distinction readers need to keep in mind. The question is not whether the United States also has industrial internet technologies. It does. The question is whether those technologies are embedded in the same kind of Party-state national strategic system. They are not.
China’s Industrial Internet is different because it sits at the intersection of civilian modernization, defense-industrial upgrading, data infrastructure, platform governance, and Party-state coordination. That is why it should not be analyzed only as manufacturing policy. It should be analyzed as part of the architecture through which China is trying to make Military-Civil Fusion operational.
5. Current Impact: What the Architecture Already Changes
A comparative analysis of the development trajectories of the Industrial Internet in the United States, Germany, and China reveals distinct approaches: In the United States, development is enterprise-led; the government has not designated it a national strategy, and the process adheres to market-oriented principles, driven by capital and spearheaded by multinational giants. Germany’s development centers on manufacturing innovation; leveraging its strengths in manufacturing R&D, it focuses on the quality of innovative products rather than price-based market competition, while adhering to a strategy of creating new industrial forms. China’s Industrial Internet development remains in its early stages, facing challenges such as a lack of independent innovation in core technologies, insufficient collaboration across market segments, a weak ecosystem, and a lack of business model innovation; development relies primarily on government leadership and policy support.
Liu Xiaoxiao and Li Hongjuan, “Overview of Industrial Internet Development Models in the US, Germany, and China,” Institute for Internet Industry, Tsinghua University, August 24, 2022.6
The current impact is not a completed system. It is a changing set of mechanisms that make industrial capability more visible, easier to connect, and more usable.
That is the near-term implication of this series. The Industrial Internet does not have to be fully mature to change how Military-Civil Fusion operates. Even partial platformization can change what can be seen, matched, coordinated, secured, and mobilized.
The first change is visibility. Industrial Internet platforms, identifier-resolution systems, cloud-connected equipment, and industrial data tools can make firms, suppliers, production capacity, equipment, components, standards, and technical capabilities easier to locate. In a traditional system, much of that capacity may remain scattered across enterprises, localities, industrial parks, research institutes, and supply chains. In a platform-based system, more of it becomes legible.
The second change is coordination. Military-Civil Fusion does not depend only on moving one technology from a civilian firm to a military user, or one defense technology into a civilian market. Platform architecture can support broader coordination among demand, supply, design, production, inspection, maintenance, services, and lifecycle support. That shifts fusion from a series of discrete transfer events toward a more continuous operating process.
The third change is scale. A platform does not only connect two actors. It can organize many actors at once: defense enterprises, civilian firms, universities, research institutes, local governments, industrial parks, investors, service providers, and technical experts. The system may not work perfectly, but it changes the scale at which civilian and defense-relevant resources can be discovered, evaluated, and connected.
The fourth change is data. In a platform-based industrial system, data is not only a byproduct of production. It becomes a means of coordination. Industrial data can reveal bottlenecks, capacity, quality problems, equipment use, supply-chain vulnerabilities, standards gaps, and technology opportunities. In defense-relevant sectors, that data can help identify where civilian capacity can support military needs and where defense-industry demand can drive broader industrial upgrading.
The fifth change is security. Once production becomes networked, data-driven, and platform-coordinated, security becomes part of the architecture itself. Equipment security, network security, platform security, application security, data security, and supply-chain security are no longer separate concerns. They become necessary conditions for the system to function.
This also changes the policy problem. Traditional policy tools often focus on discrete entities, transactions, technologies, or procurement channels. Those tools remain necessary. But platform-based fusion creates a broader challenge: the significance may lie not only in one company or one technology, but in the architecture that makes many companies, technologies, data systems, and production capabilities more connectable.
That is the current impact. China has not completed the system. It may never make every part work as designed. But the architecture already changes the analytical terrain. The key question is no longer only who owns a firm, who buys a component, or where a label appears. The question is how the system makes industrial capability visible, easier to connect, adaptable, secure, and usable across civilian and defense-relevant domains.
6. Future Implications: What Analysts Should Watch
The shipbuilding industry serves as an important industrial foundation for safeguarding national security and upholding maritime rights and interests. With a solid informatized foundation, an urgent need for transformation, and a manageable level of difficulty to implement, it is a key sector for advancing the fused application of the Industrial Internet.
“Reference Guide on the Fused Application of the Industrial Internet in the Shipbuilding Industry,” Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, June 5, 2025.
The next stage of Military-Civil Fusion may be easiest to see where the label is absent but the architecture is expanding.
That is the future implication of this series. Analysts should still watch formal Military-Civil Fusion documents, defense procurement channels, defense universities, military laboratories, and firms with known defense ties. Those indicators remain important. But they are no longer sufficient.
The key indicators may appear in the infrastructure layer: sector-specific Industrial Internet platforms, identifier-resolution nodes, industrial data systems, connected equipment, 5G and AI-enabled applications, security systems, supply-chain tools, and lifecycle-management platforms in defense-relevant industries.
Shipbuilding is one example. Aerospace, aviation, electronics, ordnance, nuclear industry, advanced equipment manufacturing, and other strategic sectors deserve the same kind of attention. The key question is not only whether a document uses the term Military-Civil Fusion. The key question is whether the system is making industrial capability more visible, searchable, matchable, reusable, controllable, and mobilizable.
Analysts should also watch the institutions around the technology. Which ministries, defense-industrial authorities, state-owned enterprises, industrial alliances, local governments, research institutes, and platform companies are involved? Which sectors receive identifier-resolution nodes, pilot demonstrations, industrial data systems, or national-level platform support? Which applications move beyond factory modernization into lifecycle coordination, supply-chain visibility, safety supervision, or production mobilization?
The future development of this architecture will not be uniform. Some platforms will fail. Some projects will remain local, fragmented, or symbolic. Some systems will be overdesigned, underused, or trapped inside bureaucratic silos. China’s Party-state can issue strategy, fund infrastructure, and coordinate institutions, but it cannot automatically make every system work as planned.
That uncertainty should not obscure the direction of travel. The Industrial Internet is being built as more than a collection of smart factories. It is becoming a coordination layer for industrial capacity. In defense-relevant sectors, that coordination layer can support both ordinary modernization and Military-Civil Fusion.
This creates a harder analytical problem than identifying one company or one technology. The strategic significance may lie in how many ordinary pieces begin to connect: platforms, data, equipment, standards, suppliers, applications, security systems, and local industrial capacity. Each piece may look civilian in isolation. The pattern appears when they begin to form an operating architecture.
This is why analysts should not wait for explicit Military-Civil Fusion wording. MIIT’s program to advance the fused application of the Industrial Internet across shipbuilding does not use the term “Military-Civil Fusion.” But the structural missions that support Military-Civil Fusion — platforms, data systems, infrastructure, security, industrial applications, and cross-sector coordination — continue to expand. The label may be absent while the architecture continues to develop.
The Digital China connection sharpens the point. “Military-Civil Deep Fusion” is a key mission of the national Digital China strategy. The term has not been used publicly in this specific context since 2018, but the systemic and structural missions that support it continue to develop. The label may be absent while the architecture continues to grow.
That is what analysts should watch next. Not only the label. Not only the firm. Not only the procurement link. Watch the infrastructure that makes capabilities easier to find, connect, adapt, secure, and use. In China’s next stage of Military-Civil Fusion, the most important evidence may not announce itself as fusion at all.
7. Look for the Operating System
…deeply implement the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy…
… Advance the coupled development of industrial chains and military operational (combat) chains. Accelerate the development of a National Innovation System for Emerging Domains and drive the upgrading of industries such as aerospace and aviation, electronic information, and new materials. Strengthen the “two-way embedding” of innovation chains and the deep fusion of industrial chains and military operational (combat) chains; cultivate an Industrial Support System aligned with New Quality Combat Forces; and realize the interconnection and complementary strengths between the civilian-use industry and national defense industry, thereby providing robust support for enhancing New Quality Combat Forces.
Zhang Zhan, Political Commissar of the National University of Defense Technology, “Accelerate the Building of Strategic Capabilities in Emerging Domains,” Study Times, May 6, 2026, Page 6. The National University of Defense Technology is directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission.7
To understand the next stage of China’s Military-Civil Fusion, do not look only for the label. Look for the operating system.
Military-Civil Fusion is still a strategy. It is still a policy framework. It still appears in institutions, documents, procurement channels, industrial parks, research programs, and technology-transfer mechanisms. Those indicators remain important. But the evidence reviewed in this series shows that Military-Civil Fusion is also changing form.
It is becoming infrastructure.
The Industrial Internet helps explain how that happens. It can make industrial resources more visible, data more usable, platforms more connected, suppliers more searchable, equipment more networked, standards more interoperable, and production capacity easier to coordinate. In strategic industries, those functions can support both civilian modernization and defense-relevant mobilization.
The point is not that every Industrial Internet project is military, every civilian firm is a defense actor, or China has already built a seamless national system. The conclusion is more precise: China is trying to build the architecture through which dual-use ambiguity can be organized, managed, and used.
That is where strategy becomes infrastructure. Part One showed the strategic ambition. Part Two showed the policy trail. Part Three showed platform development. Part Four showed ecosystem logic. Part Five has argued that these layers point toward the same conclusion: Military-Civil Fusion is moving into the systems that make industrial capability easier to find, connect, adapt, secure, and mobilize.
This is why the Industrial Internet deserves more attention. It is not just a manufacturing upgrade. It is not just a smart-factory program. It is not just another technology policy. In China’s system, it can become part of the operating architecture for national industrial power.
The analytical lesson is simple. If analysts look only for explicit Military-Civil Fusion language, they will miss much of the system. If they look only for individual firms, they will miss the platforms. If they look only for procurement links, they will miss the data, standards, identifiers, security systems, and lifecycle tools that make capability more usable.
Military-Civil Fusion is changing form.
The next form may not always announce itself as Military-Civil Fusion.
It may look like infrastructure.
I use AI tools to support my editing, research, and translation process. Learn more on my AI Transparency Page.
Footnotes
- “国务院27日印发《关于深化“互联网+先进制造业” 发展工业互联网的指导意见》，提出未来三个阶段的发展目标：到2025年，覆盖各地区、各行业的工业互联网网络基础设施基本建成，工业互联网标识解析体系不断健全并规模化推广，基本形成具备国际竞争力的基础设施和产业体系；到2035年，建成国际领先的工业互联网网络基础设施和平台，工业互联网全面深度应用并在优势行业形成创新引领能力，重点领域实现国际领先；到本世纪中叶，工业互联网创新发展能力、技术产业体系以及融合应用等全面达到国际先进水平，综合实力进入世界前列。” See, “State Council Outlines “Three-Step” Goal for Industrial Internet Development” (国务院明确工业互联网发展“三步走”目标), Economic Reference (经济参考报), November 28, 2017. ↩︎
- “实施军民融合发展战略，是中国长期探索经济建设和国防建设协调发展规律的重大成果。” See, “Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy” (军民融合发展战略), State Council Information Office, July 11, 2019. Note: The title is incorrectly translated into English as “Strategy for Military-Civil Integration” in the State Council Information Office document. ↩︎
- “构建一体化的国家战略体系和能力，一个很现实的路径就是健全和完善国家发展战略体系与国家安全战略体系之间的耦合机制，促进军民融合战略与其他国家战略的紧密结合。” See, Jiang Luming, Wang Weihai (姜鲁鸣, 王伟海), “Building a Unified National Strategic System and Capability” (构建一体化的国家战略体系和能力), Guangming Daily, November 10, 2017. ↩︎
- “军民两用产业互联网赋能平台。 源于国防军工，深厚的工业知识积累，三大核心应用: 国防军工创新平台，工业互联网平台，产业发展赋能中心。。。 国防军工创新平台。互联网+的创新模式，积极开展”民参军、军转民”服务，依托合作单位的技术、市场等优势资源，为优势民企和军工企业提供精准的技术服务、市场咨询、项目对接、课题申报。。。” See, “Platform Introduction” (平台介绍), Beijing Hangxin Jiahe Technology Co. Ltd (北京航信佳禾科技有限公司), Accessed June 24, 2026. ↩︎
- “5G与工业互联网的融合将加速数字中国、智慧社会建设，加速中国新型工业化进程，为中国经济发展注入新动能，为疫情阴霾笼罩下的世界经济创造新的发展机遇。” See, “Xi Jinping Sends a Congratulatory Message to the 2020 China 5G+Industrial Internet Conference” (习近平向2020中国5G+工业互联网大会致贺信), Xinhua (新华社), November 20, 2020. ↩︎
- “通过综合比较美、德、中三国工业互联网的发展历程，可以发现：美国工业互联网的发展由企业主导，政府并未将其列为国家战略，主要坚持市场化原则，以资本为导向，由跨国巨头推进。德国工业互联网的发展则以其制造业创新为核心，根据其自身在制造研发领域的优势，聚焦于其创新产品质量而非市场价格竞争，坚持打造新型工业形态的战略。中国工业互联网的发展仍处于初级阶段，面临着核心技术缺乏自主创新、细分领域之间合作不足、生态体系薄弱、商业模式创新不够等问题，主要依靠政府主导以及相关政策扶持发展。” See, Liu Xiaoxiao (刘霄枭), Li Hongjuan (李红娟), “Overview of Industrial Internet Development Models in the US, Germany, and China” (美、德、中工业互联网发展模式概述), Institute for Internet Industry, Tsinghua University (清华大学互联网产业研究院), August 24, 2022. ↩︎
- “…深入贯彻军民融合发展战略…” / “推动产业链、作战链耦合发展。加快新兴领域国家创新体系发展，带动航空航天、电子信息、新材料等产业升级，加强创新链“双向嵌入”、产业链与作战链深度融合，培育与新质战斗力配套的产业支撑体系，实现民用工业与国防工业互联互通、优势互补，为提升新质战斗力提供有力支撑。” See, Zhang Zhan (张战), “Accelerate the Building of Strategic Capabilities in Emerging Domains” (加快新兴领域战略能力建设), Study Times (学习时报), May 6, 2026, Page 6. Also see the full translation by Sinocism. ↩︎